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Abstract
We formalize a cryptographic primitive called functional commitment (FC) which can be viewed
as a generalization of vector commitments (VCs), polynomial commitments and many other spe-
cial kinds of commitment schemes. A non-interactive functional commitment allows committing
to a message in such a way that the committer has the flexibility of only revealing a function of
the committed message during the opening phase. We provide constructions for the functionality
of linear functions, where messages consist of vectors over some domain and commitments can
later be opened to a specific linear function of the vector coordinates. An opening for a function
thus generates a witness for the fact that the function indeed evaluates to a given value for the
committed message. One security requirement is called function binding and requires that no
adversary be able to open a commitment to two different evaluations for the same function.
We propose a construction of functional commitment for linear functions based on constant-
size assumptions in composite order groups endowed with a bilinear map. The construction has
commitments and openings of constant size (i.e., independent of n or function description) and is
perfectly hiding – the underlying message is information theoretically hidden. Our security proofs
build on the Déjà Q framework of Chase and Meiklejohn (Eurocrypt 2014) and its extension by
Wee (TCC 2016) to encryption primitives, thus relying on constant-size subgroup decisional as-
sumptions. We show that FC for linear functions are sufficiently powerful to solve four open
problems. They, first, imply polynomial commitments, and, then, give cryptographic accumu-
lators (i.e., an algebraic hash function which makes it possible to efficiently prove that some
input belongs to a hashed set). In particular, specializing our FC construction leads to the first
pairing-based polynomial commitments and accumulators for large universes known to achieve
security under simple assumptions. We also substantially extend our pairing-based accumulator
to handle subset queries which requires a non-trivial extension of the Déjà Q framework.
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1 Introduction
Commitment schemes are fundamental primitives used as building blocks in a number of
cryptographic protocols. A commitment scheme emulates a publicly observed safe; it allows
a party to commit to a message m so that this message is not revealed until a later moment
when the commitment is opened and the receiver gets convinced that the message was indeed
m. Two important security properties are called hiding and binding. The former requires
that no information about the message is revealed to an observer. The latter property means
that the committing party cannot change the message after committing to it.
Several works considered commitment schemes where the committer has the flexibil-
ity of only revealing some partial information about the message (rather than the entire
message) during the opening phase. In vector commitments [22, 10], messages are vectors
and commitments are only opened with respect to specific positions. Another example is
polynomial commitments, where users commit to a polynomial and only reveal evaluations
of this polynomial on certain inputs.
In this work, we consider functional commitments (FC) for linear functions. Namely,
messages consist of vectors (m1, . . . ,mn) and commitments can be partially opened by having
the sender verifiably reveal a linear combination
∑n
i=1 xi ·mi, for public coefficients {xi}ni=1.
We show that this functionality implies many other natural functionalities, including vector
commitments, polynomial commitments and cryptographic accumulators. We provide an
efficient FC realization for linear functions based on well-studied assumptions in groups with
a bilinear map. In turn, our scheme implies solutions to past natural questions. We give the
first constructions under constant-size assumptions of two important primitives: polynomial
commitments and cryptographic accumulators. In both cases, earlier solutions were based
on non-standard assumptions where the number of input elements (and thus the strength of
the assumption) depended on specific features of the schemes (like the maximal degree of
committed polynomials). Our third result is a solution to an accumulator supporting subset
queries, which is also based on constant size assumptions.
1.1 Related Works and the Open Problems
Functional commitments. Functional commitments can be seen as the natural commitment
analogue of functional encryption [31, 6]. The latter primitive allows restricting what the
receiver learns about encrypted data: when decrypting using a secret key SKF for the
function F , the decryptor learns F (x) and nothing else. Likewise, FC schemes allow the
committer to accurately control what the opening phase can reveal about the message.
Functional commitments were implicitly suggested by Gorbunov, Vaikuntanathan and
Wichs [17] who described a statistically-hiding commitment scheme for which the sender
is able to only reveal a circuit evaluation C(x) when x is the committed input. While
their solution supports arbitrary circuits and relies on well-studied lattice assumptions, its
input x must be committed to in a bit-by-bit manner (or at least by splitting x into small
blocks). We remark that, assuming a common reference string, non-interactive FC for general
functionalities can be realized by combining ordinary statistically-hiding commitments with
non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs [3]. Here, we focus on the problem of achieving
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a better efficiency for more restricted (yet, sufficiently powerful for many applications)
functionalities. Assuming a common reference string (as in all non-interactive perfectly
hiding commitments), we aim at efficient constructions supporting short witnesses without
resorting to the machinery of NIZK proofs. In particular, we aim at constant-size commitment
strings (regardless of how long the message is) supporting concise witnesses.
In the literature, a number of earlier works consider settings where a sender is given
the flexibility of revealing only a partial information about committed data. A verifiable
random function [25], for example, can be seen as a perfectly binding commitment to a
pseudo-random function key for which the committer can convince a verifier about the correct
function evaluation for the committed key on a given input. Selective-opening security [16]
addresses the problem of proving the security of un-opened commitments when an adversary
gets to see the opening of other commitments to possibly correlated messages.
Zero-knowledge sets, as introduced by Micali, Rabin and Kilian [24], are another prominent
example where users commit to a set S or an elementary database and subsequently prove
the (non-)membership of some elements without revealing any further information (not
even the cardinality of the committed set S). Ostrovsky, Rackoff and Smith [27] envisioned
committed databases for which the sender can demonstrate more general statements than
just membership and non-membership.
Vector commitments. Concise vector commitments were first suggested by Libert and
Yung [22] and further developed by Catalano and Fiore [10]. They basically consist of
Pedersen-like [30] commitments to vectors (m1, . . . ,mn) where a constant-size opening
(where “constant” means independent of n) allows the sender to open the commitment
for only one coordinate mi without revealing anything on other coordinates. The initial
motivation of vector commitments was the design of zero-knowledge databases with short
proofs [11, 22] via mercurial commitments [12] supporting short coordinate-wise openings
[22]. While concise vector commitments can be based on long-lived hardness assumptions
like RSA or Computational Diffie-Hellman [10], they either require groups of hidden order or
public keys of size O(n2) if n is the dimension of committed vectors. In contrast, solutions
based on variable-size assumptions allow for public keys of size O(n), which leaves open the
following problem.
Problem 1: Is there a concise vector commitment scheme achieving linear-size public keys
under constant-size assumptions in groups with a bilinear map?
Polynomial commitments. As introduced by Kate, Zaverucha and Goldberg [19], polyno-
mial commitments are a mechanism whereby a sender can generate a constant-size commit-
ment to a polynomial P [Z] (where “constant” means independent of the degree) in such a
way that a constant-size witness can convince a verifier that the committed P [Z] indeed
evaluates to P (i) for a given i. Polynomial commitments find natural applications in the
context of verifiable secret sharing [14], anonymous credentials with attributes [7] or in
optimized flavors of zero-knowledge databases which do not seek to hide the size of the
committed set. They also imply vector commitments, as observed in [7]. Camenisch et al.
[7] used vector commitments in a modular design of anonymous credentials where users’
credentials are associated with descriptive attributes. While the commitments in [19, 7] were
based on parameterized assumptions, the problem described below has been open.
Problem 2: Design a polynomial commitment based on constant-size assumptions.
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Accumulators. Cryptographic accumulators can be interpreted as commitments, especially
when the hashing algorithm is randomized. Accumulators [2] are closely related to zero-
knowledge sets in that they make it possible to hash a set S while efficiently generating
witnesses guaranteeing the inclusion of certain elements in the hashed set. Unlike zero-
knowledge sets, they do not hide the cardinality of the underlying set but usually achieve
a better efficiency via short membership witnesses. The first family of accumulators based
on number theoretic techniques relies on groups of hidden order [2, 1, 23, 4] and includes
proposals based on the Strong RSA assumption [1, 21]. The second family [26, 8], which was
first explored by Nguyen [26], appeals to bilinear maps (a.k.a. pairings) and assumptions
whose hardness depends on a parameter q determined by features of the scheme or the
number of adversarial queries.
Solutions based on the Strong RSA assumption feature short public parameters and
readily extend into universal accumulators [21] (where non-membership witnesses can show
that a given input was not accumulated) or dynamic accumulators [9] (where witnesses
can be autonomously updated when the hashed set is modified). On the other hand, they
usually require expensive operations to injectively encode set elements as prime numbers.
While pairing-based schemes [26, 8] do not need such a prime-number-encoding, they require
linear-size public parameters in the maximal number of accumulated elements. On the
positive side, they are useful in applications where the number of hashed elements cannot
exceed a pre-determined bound. Pairing-based accumulators also proved useful in the context
of authenticated data structures. Papamanthou et al. [29] used them to authenticate set
operations and notably prove (using a constant-size witness) the inclusion of a given set in
the accumulated set. The same technique was extended [29] to provide evidence that two
accumulated sets have a given intersection.
A third family of accumulators [28, 4] builds on hash trees rather than number theoretic
assumptions. Its disadvantage is that witnesses have size O(logN) (where N denote the
cardinality of hashed sets) whereas number-theoretic solutions enable O(1)-size witnesses.
The security properties of accumulators were recently re-formalized by Derler et al.
[15] who showed connections with other primitives. It was notably showed that, when en-
dowed with an indistinguishability property, accumulators imply non-interactive commitment
schemes and are implied by zero-knowledge sets.
Despite their numerous applications, cryptographic accumulators still have relatively few
assumptions to rely on. So far, known candidates based on standard assumption arise from
a generic construction from vector commitments [10]. While implying solutions based on
RSA or Diffie-Hellman, the generic construction of [10] only supports inputs living in a small
domain: the public key size is indeed linear in the size of the input universe, which prevents
from hashing elements consisting of arbitrary strings. This leaves open Problem 3.
Problem 3: Does there exist a pairing-based accumulator for large input universes secure
under constant-size assumptions?
As mentioned earlier, accumulators are applicable in authenticating set operations ([29])
and a useful extension would allow creating witnesses for set inclusion and intersection that
are of constant size. Namely, a short witness can serve as evidence that some set X is a
subset of the accumulated set or that two sets X1, X2 have a particular intersection I. In
this domain, the following problem still remains open.
Problem 4: Construct a pairing-based accumulator supporting set operations with constant-
size witnesses achieving security under simple assumptions.
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1.2 Our Contributions
We formalize the notion of functional commitments (FCs) for linear functions, a generalization
of vector commitments (VCs). Similar to VCs, such a commitment scheme allows committing
to vectors of messages which can later be opened to specific function evaluations. While
possible [17], the design of FCs for arbitrary functionalities seems unlikely to lead to truly
efficient solutions. Instead, we aim at FCs for linear function families {F~x : Dn × Dn →
D}~x∈Dn defined by F~x(~m) = 〈~x, ~m〉 =
∑n
i=1 ximi for ~m ∈ Dn that suffice for many important
applications. An FC scheme for a family of linear functions {F~x : Dn → D}~x∈Dn produces
commitments to messages of the form ~m = (m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ Dn over the domain D. Fixing a
specific ~x ∈ Dn, such that y = ∑ni=1 ximi ∈ D, an opening for F~x demonstrates that F~x(~m)
indeed evaluates to y. The security notions of hiding and binding extend to our setting in a
natural way. In addition, we require the commitments and witnesses to be concise i.e., their
size should be independent of the length of messages or function description.
Our first contribution is a construction of functional commitment for linear functions
based on well-studied assumptions in composite order bilinear groups. The scheme is perfectly
hiding and computationally binding under subgroup decision assumptions. The construction
can be seen as a variant of the vector commitment scheme of Izabachène et al. [18] which
was only proved secure under a non-standard variable-size assumption. We show that the
composite-order setting makes it possible to use the Déjà Q framework of [13] so as to
obtain security from constant size assumptions. As FC for linear functions implies vector
commitments, our construction provides a positive answer to Problem 1.
As a second contribution, we show that our FC scheme implies polynomial commitments
and large-universe accumulators supporting subset queries. The resulting schemes are secure
under subgroup decision assumptions of constant-size thus settling Problem 2 and Problem 3.
We finally extend our accumulator into a scheme supporting subset queries while retaining
security from constant size assumptions, partially answering Problem 4 in the affirmative.
Overview of our Construction. Let e : G×G→ GT be a bilinear map with common group
order N = p1p2p3 and let Gq denote the subgroup of G of order q (here q would be of the
form pe11 p
e2
2 p
e3
3 for e1, e2, e3 ∈ {0, 1}). The linear functions will be defined over ZN . The
commitment key consists of {gαj}nj=1, {Uj = uα
j}j∈[1,2n]\{n+1} for some g, u ∈ Gp1 . The
trapdoor is Un+1 = uα
n+1 . A commitment to ~m consists of C = gγ ·∏nj=1 gαjmj . Witness for
a function evaluation 〈~x, ~m〉 = y is defined asWy =
∏n
i=1W
xi
i with the Gp1 component ofWi
being uαn−i+1γ ·∏nj=1,j 6=i uαn+1+j−imj for each i = 1, . . . , n. The absence of Un+1 in the witness
allows verifying that y = 〈~x, ~m〉 by testing if e(C,∏ni=1 uαn−i+1xi) = e(gα, uαn)y · e(g,Wy).
The u-components are randomized with elements of Gp3 . This modification does not affect
verification since the Gp3 components get cancelled upon pairing with Gp1 elements. The
scheme is a composite-order analogue of the one proposed in [22].
Proof Idea. A (q1 → q2) subgroup decision assumption requires random elements of Gq1
to be indistinguishable from random elements of Gq2 . Using Wee’s adaptation [32] of the
Déjà Q framework [13], we prove that our FC scheme is computationally binding based on
(p1 → p1p2) and (p1p3 → p1p2p3) subgroup decision assumptions. An adversary breaking the
binding property is successful if it can produce a commitment C and two conflicting witnesses
Wy and Wy′ for evaluation of a function ~x. Given that both witnesses satisfy the verification
equations, one can say that the adversary can essentially produce ∆W =
(
Wy′/Wy
)1/(y−y′)
which is of the form u(αn+1) · gr22 · gr33 for some r2, r3 ∈ ZN and generators g2 ∈ Gp2 and
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g3 ∈ Gp3 . The Gp1 component of ∆W is identical to that of the trapdoor key. Define two
types of keys (resp. attacks) according to {Uj}2nj=1 (resp. ∆W ) containing a Gp2 component
or not. We argue that the attacker cannot mount an attack of a type different from that
of the key based on the (p1 → p1p2). The distribution of Gp2 components for the keys are
changed gradually via the transition described below.
uα
i
R3,i
subgroup−−−−−−→ uαigr1αi2 R3,i CRT−−−→ uα
i
g
r1α
i
1
2 R3,i,
where α1 is uniformly distributed over ZN . The first transition uses the p1p3 → p1p2p3
subgroup decision assumptions and the second transition is based on the Chinese remainder
theorem (CRT) that states that α mod p1 and α mod p2 are uncorrelated. We can thus replace
α mod p2 by α1 mod p2 as long as the former is unconditionally hidden from the attacker. By
repeating the transition 2n times, we obtain the transformation: uαi → uαig
∑2n
j=1
rjα
i
j
2 R
′
3,i.
The exponent of g2 is a pseudorandom function [13, 32] and hence can be replaced by
a random exponent, RF (i) for Ui in particular. After the final transition, creating ∆W
consistent with these keys amounts to predicting the value of the random function evaluated
at n+ 1 (for the trapdoor Un+1), which is statistically infeasible.
Polynomial Commitments from Simple Assumptions. We wish to commit to a polynomial
P [Z] = a0 + a1Z + · · ·+ an−1Zn−1 of degree n over D and reveal an opening for P (x) for
x ∈ D. Using the FC scheme for linear functions, we can commit to (a0, . . . , an−1) ∈ Dn so
that an opening to P (x) is a witness for 〈~x, ~m〉 = P (x) where ~x = (1, x, . . . , xn−1).
Accumulators for Large Universes. An accumulator allows hashing a set to a single element
so that one can prove the membership of a value in the set. Vector commitments are known
to imply accumulators [10], but via a construction that only supports a small universe of
values. Our polynomial commitment naturally leads to an accumulator for large universes
(i.e., the domain size can be exponential in the security parameter). To accumulate a set
of values S = {y1, . . . , yn−1}, use a polynomial commitment to P [Z] =
∏n−1
i=1 (Z − yi). A
witness for x ∈ S (or x /∈ S) is generated based on the fact P [x] = 0 if and only if x ∈ S.
Tackling Subset Queries. Polynomial commitments and universal accumulators can be
seen as direct consequences of the FC for linear functions. On the other hand, proving
security for accumulators with concise subset witnesses requires a novel extension of the Déjà
Q framework. We now provide a brief outline of the same.
Let n be the maximal number of accumulated values and let d be the maximal size
of “provable” subsets. In the commitment scheme, keys consisted of powers of α in the
exponent over the interval [1, 2n] with a hole at position n + 1. We extend this interval
to [1, (d + 1)n] keeping n + 1, 2n + 1, . . . , (d + 1)n powers of α as part of the trapdoor.
The witness component for a specific position i of the linear function was defined as Wi =
uα
n−i+1γ ·∏nj=1,j 6=i uαn+1+j−imj . To combine witnesses for several (at most d) values into a
constant-size witness, we define the witness for the i-th position of the `-th element as a
“shift” of Wi by n. More precisely, W`,i is defined to have uα
`n−i+1γ ·∏nj=1,j 6=i uα`n+1+j−imj
as its Gp1 component.
Security for accumulators is captured by the notion of collision-freeness which asserts
that it is computationally infeasible for an attacker to produce a set S and a witness WX
for a subset X = {x1, . . . , xk} 6⊆ S that verifies correctly with an accumulated value for
S (generated using randomness specified by the adversary). Given the randomness, the
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reduction can compute valid witnesses of membership and non-membership for individual
values in X (as in the normal accumulator scheme). Combining appropriate “shifts” of
these witnesses gives us WX∩S (combined membership witness) and WX\S (combined non-
membership witness). We then observe that W/(WX∩SWX\S) has a Gp1 -component of the
form u
∑
`∈[1,k],x` /∈S
w`α
`n+1
(w` 6= 0) which means that the attacker essentially produces a
linear combination of the discrete logarithms of trapdoor keys in the exponent. The rest
of the reduction proceeds similar to the FC scheme with the pseudorandom function now
extending to the larger interval. Using this pseudorandom function, the distribution of the
keys is gradually modified until the Gp2 components of all Ui’s are truly random. We argue
that generating such a witness requires the adversary to predict a linear combination of at
most d specific evaluations of a random function which is clearly infeasible.
2 Background
2.1 Bilinear Maps and Complexity Assumptions
We use groups (G,GT ) of composite order N = p1p2p3 endowed with an efficiently computable
map (a.k.a. pairing) e : G×G→ GT such that: (1) e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab for any (g, h) ∈ G×G
and a, b ∈ Z; (2) if e(g, h) = 1GT for each h ∈ G, then g = 1G. Also, pairing two elements of
order pi and pj , with i 6= j, always gives the identity element 1GT .
In the following, for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we denote by Gpi the subgroup of order pi. For all
distinct i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we call Gpipj the subgroup of order pipj . We rely on the following
assumptions introduced in [20], which are non-interactive, falsifiable. In both of them, the
number of input elements is constant (regardless of the number of adversarial queries).
Assumption 1. Given a description of (G,GT ) as well as g
R← Gp1 , X3 R← Gp3 and T ∈ G, it
is infeasible to efficiently decide if T ∈ Gp1p2 or T ∈ Gp1 .
Assumption 2. Let g,X1
R← Gp1 , X2, Y2 R← Gp2 , Y3, Z3 R← Gp3 . Given a description of
(G,GT ), (g,X1X2, Z3, Y2Y3) and T , it is hard to decide if T ∈R Gp1p3 or T ∈R G.
2.2 Vector Commitment Schemes
In prime order groups, Libert and Yung [22] introduced concise vector commitment schemes,
which are commitments that can be opened with a short de-commitment string for each
individual coordinate. Such commitments were described in [22, 10]. In [22], the commitment
key is CK = (g, g1, . . . , gn, gn+2, . . . , g2n) ∈ G2n, where gi = g(αi) for each i. The trapdoor is
gn+1. To commit to ~m = (m1, . . . ,mn), one picks r
R← Zp and computes C = gr ·
∏n
j=1 g
mκ
n+1−j .
A single elementWi = gri ·
∏n
j=1,j 6=i g
mj
n+1−j+i provides evidence that mi is the i-th component
of ~m as it satisfies e(gi, C) = e(g,Wi) · e(g1, gn)mi . The infeasibility of opening C to two
distinct messages for some i relies on a parametrized assumption [5].
2.3 Functional Commitments for Linear Functions: Definitions
In [18], Izabachène et al. implicitly showed that the vector commitment scheme of [22] can be
generalized into a commitment scheme allowing to commit to a vector ~m while proving – via
a partial opening made of a short piece of information – that the committed vector ~m satisfies
〈~m, ~x〉 = y, for some public ~m and y. We call such a primitive functional commitment for
linear functions. In this section, we formally define this primitive and its security.
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I Definition 1 (Functional Commitments). Let D be a domain and consider linear functions
〈·, ·〉 : Dn×Dn → D defined by 〈~x, ~m〉 = ∑ni=1 ximi for ~x, ~m ∈ Dn with ~x = (x1, . . . , xn), ~m =
(m1, . . . ,mn). A functional commitment scheme FC for (D, n, 〈·, ·〉) is a tuple of four (possibly
probabilistic) polynomial time algorithms – (Setup,Commit,Open,Verify).
Setup(1λ, 1n): takes in a security parameter λ ∈ N, a desired message length n ∈ poly(λ)
and outputs a commitment key CK and, optionally, a trapdoor TK.
Commit(CK, ~m): takes as input the commitment key CK, a message vector ~m ∈ Dn and
outputs a commitment C for ~m and auxiliary information denotes aux.
Open(CK,C, aux, ~x): takes as input the commitment key CK, a commitment C (to ~m),
auxiliary information (possibly containing ~m) and a vector ~x ∈ Dn; computes a witness
Wy for y = 〈~x, ~m〉 i.e., Wy is a witness for the fact that the linear function defined by ~x
when evaluated on ~m gives y.
Verify(CK,C,Wy, ~x, y): takes as input the commitment key CK, a commitment C, a
witness Wy, a vector ~x ∈ Dn and y ∈ D; outputs 1 if Wy is a witness for C being a
commitment for some ~m ∈ Dn such that 〈~x, ~y〉 = y and outputs 0 otherwise.
The correctness condition for a functional commitment scheme requires that for every
(CK,TK) ← Setup(λ, n), for all ~m, ~x ∈ Dn, if (C, aux) ← Commit(CK, ~m) and Wy ←
Open(CK,C, aux, ~x), then Verify(CK,C,Wy, ~x, y) = 1 with probability 1.
The security requirements of functional commitments are formalized as follows. The per-
fect hiding property mandates that the distribution of the commitment string
Commit(CK, ~m) be independent of the message ~m.
I Definition 2 (Perfectly Hiding). A commitment scheme is perfectly hiding if for a key CK
generated by an honest setup, for all ~m1, ~m2 ∈ Dn with ~m1 6= ~m2, the two distributions
{CK,Commit(CK, ~m1)} and {CK,Commit(CK, ~m2)} are identical given that the random
coins of Commit are chosen according to the uniform distribution from the respective domain.
The binding property requires the infeasibility of generating a commitment C and
accepting witnesses for two distinct values y, y′ without knowing the trapdoor TK.
I Definition 3 (Function Binding). A functional commitment scheme FC = (Setup,Commit,
Open,Verify) for (D, n, 〈·, ·〉) is said to be computationally binding if any PPT adversary A
has negligible advantage in winning the following game.
1. The challenger generates (CK,TK) by running Setup(λ, n) and gives CK to A.
2. The adversary A outputs a commitment C, a vector ~x ∈ Dn, two values y, y′ ∈ D and two
witnesses Wy,Wy′ . We say that A wins the game if the following conditions hold.
(i) y 6= y′;
(ii) Verify(CK,C,Wy, ~x, y) = Verify(CK,C,Wy′ , ~x, y′) = 1.
2.4 Cryptographic Accumulators
The basic functionality of an accumulator is to combine a set S of values into a single value
V so that for any x ∈ S it is possible to prove that x is accumulated in V .
I Definition 4 (Accumulator). Let D be a domain. An accumulator scheme Acc for D is a
tuple (Setup,Eval,WitCreate,Verify) of PPT algorithms defined as follows.
Setup(1λ, 1n): takes as input a security parameter λ and an integer n ∈ N upper bounding
the number of elements that can be accumulated; outputs a pair of keys (PK,SK).
Eval(PK,S): inputs a key PK, a set S ⊂ D of elements (with |S| ≤ n) to be accumulated
and outputs an accumulated value V along with some auxiliary information aux.
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WitCreate(PK,S, V, aux, x, type): inputs a public key PK, a set S, a pair of accumulated
value and state information (V, aux) generated by Eval(PK,S), an element x ∈ D and
a boolean value type ∈ {0, 1} indicating whether the output should be membership or
non-membership witness according as its value is 1 or 0 respectively.
Case type = 1: If x /∈ S, it returns ⊥. Otherwise, a membership witness W is returned.
Case type = 0: It returns ⊥ if x ∈ S and a non-membership witness W otherwise.
Verify(PK, V,W, x, type): takes as input the public key PK, an accumulator V for set S,
a witness W , an element x ∈ D and a boolean value type. Returns 1 if and only if either
W is a valid witness for x ∈ S and type = 1
W is a valid witness for x /∈ S and type = 0.
The above definition consider static accumulators. In dynamic accumulators, the accumulated
value as well as witnesses can be publicly updated whenever an element is added to or deleted
from the set. In this work, we only consider static accumulators.
The correctness condition requires that for all honestly generated keys, all honestly
computed accumulators and witnesses, the Verify algorithm always accepts. An accumulator
scheme is deemed secure if it is at least collision-free. Collision-freeness ensures the computa-
tional infeasibility of producing either a membership witness for a non-accumulated value or
a non-membership witness for an accumulated value.
In accumulators supporting subset queries, witnesses can be generated for a subset of the
accumulated set rather than individual elements. While accumulators have been defined in
the universal setting, i.e., both membership and non-membership witnesses can be generated,
here we only consider the non-universal setting.
I Definition 5 (Accumulator with subset queries). Let D be a domain. An accumulator scheme
Acc for D is defined by a tuple (Setup,Eval,WitCreate,Verify) of probabilistic polynomial
time algorithms defined as follows.
Setup(1λ, 1n, 1d): takes as input a security parameter λ, an upper bound n ∈ N on the
number of elements that can be accumulated and an integer d ∈ N denoting the maximum
size of a set for which a witness can be created; outputs a pair of keys (PK,SK).
Eval(PK,S): takes in a public key PK, a set S ⊂ D of elements (with |S| ≤ n) to be
accumulated and outputs an accumulated value V with some auxiliary information aux.
WitCreate(PK,S, V, aux, X): inputs a public key PK, a set S, a pair of accumulated
value and state information (V, aux) generated by Eval(PK,S), a set X ⊆ S with |X| ≤ d
and outputs a witness WX .
Verify(PK, V,WX , X): takes as input the public key PK, an accumulator V for set S, a
witness WX , a set X ⊆ S. Returns 1 if WX is a witness for X ⊆ S and ⊥ otherwise.
In the above syntax, we assume that the auxiliary information aux includes the randomness
that was used to compute V when Eval is a probabilistic algorithm.
3 A Functional Commitment from Subgroup Decision Assumptions
Here, we prove that the Déjà Q framework [13] allows proving the security of the functional
commitment of [18] under constant size assumptions by switching to composite order groups.
Setup(1λ, 1n): Choose bilinear groups (G,GT ) of composite order N = p1p2p3, where
pi > 2l(λ) for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, for a suitable polynomial l : N→ N. Choose g, u R← Gp1,
R3
R← Gp3 and α R← ZN at random in order to define Gj = gα
j for each j ∈ [1, n] and
U1 = uα ·R3,1, . . . Un = u(αn) ·R3,n,
Un+2 = u(α
n+2) ·R3,n+2, . . . U2n = u(α2n) ·R3,2n,
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where R3,j
R← Gp3 for each j ∈ [1, 2n]\{n+ 1}. Define the commitment key to consist of
CK :=
(
g, {Gj}nj=1, {Uj}j∈[1,2n]\{n+1}, R3
)
. The trapdoor consists of TK := Un+1 =
u(α
n+1) ·R3,n+1, where R3,n+1 R← Gp3 .
Commit(CK, ~m): Given ~m = (m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ ZnN , compute C = gγ ·
∏n
j=1G
mj
j for a ran-
dom choice of γ R← ZN and output C with the auxiliary information aux = (m1, . . . ,mn, γ).
Open(CK,C, aux, ~x): Given ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ ZnN , the auxiliary information aux =
(m1, . . . ,mn, γ) allows generating a witness for the function 〈~m, ~x〉 =
∑n
i=1mi · xi by
computing
Wi = Uγn−i+1 ·
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
U
mj
n+1+j−i ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (1)
and outputting Wy =
∏n
i=1W
xi
i .
Verify(CK,C,Wy, ~x, y): Given C ∈ G and ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ ZnN , accept Wy ∈ G as
evidence that C is a commitment to ~m ∈ ZnN such that y = 〈~m, ~x〉 if and only if it holds
that e(C,
∏n
i=1 U
xi
n−i+1) = e(G1, Un)y · e(g,Wy). If so, output 1. Otherwise, return 0.
The correctness is verified by observing that, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (1) implies that
e(C,Un−i+1) = e(g, u)(α
n+1)mi · e(g, Uγn−i+1 n∏
j=1,j 6=i
U
mj
n+j−i+1
)
= e(G1, Un)mi · e(g,Wi).
By raising both members of the above equality to the power xi ∈ ZN and taking the product
over all i ∈ [1, n], we find that Wy satisfies e(C,
∏n
i=1 U
xi
n−i+1) = e(G1, Un)〈~m,~x〉 · e(g,Wy).
It is clear that that the commitment is perfectly hiding: since C lives in the cyclic
subgroup Gp1 , any vector (m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ ZnN has a corresponding opening γ ∈ ZN (and
even p2p3 openings since only γ mod p1 is fixed by ~m).
We now prove it computationally binding under subgroup assumptions. While this
property can be proved via a reduction from the one-wayness of Wee’s broadcast encryption
[32, Section 4], we found it interesting to give a direct proof under the underlying assumptions
for two reasons. First, this proof allows relying on a computational (rather than decisional)
analogue of Assumption 1. Second, the proof provides insights allowing to prove the security
of variants of this commitment or the other primitives it implies. For example, by adapting
the proof of Theorem 6, we design an accumulator supporting subset queries in section 5.
Since the latter scheme has a public key containing more elements than in [32], it can hardly
be proved secure via a reduction from the security of Wee’s broadcast encryption [32].
The proof involves two computationally indistinguishable distributions of parameters
(CK,TK). The normal distribution is as in the real scheme whereas the semi-functional
distribution allows CK and TK to have a Gp2 component. As in [32, Theorem 2], we use the
Déjà Q framework so as to gradually move to a game where the {Ui}2ni=1 all contain a Gp2
component gR(i)2 which is determined by a random function R : [1, 2n]→ Zp2 . As in [22, 18],
we rely on the fact that any attack against the binding property publicly reveals a value
Un+1 which contains u(α
n+1) as its Gp1 component. Depending on whether Un+1 contains a
Gp2 component or not, we speak of Type B or Type A attacks. The proof uses a subsequence
of 2n games where, in the k-th game, the Gp2 component of Ui is of the form g
Fk(i)
2 , where
Fk : [1, 2n]→ Zp2 is a k-wise independent function. The strategy of the proof is to show that,
unless either Assumption 1 or Assumption 2 can broken, the attack on the binding property
also reveals a Un+1 of the form Un+1 = u(α
n+1) · gFk(n+1)2 ·R3, for some R3 ∈ Gp3 in the k-th
game. Said otherwise, the attack reveals a trapdoor Un+1 which mimics the distribution of
the commitment key CK. When we reach the 2n-th game, the Gp2 component of each Ui
is determined by F2n(i). Since F2n(.) is a 2n-wise independent function, the Gp2 of Un+1
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is thus statistically independent of those of {Ui}i∈[1,2n]\{i}, which appear in the public key.
The proof of Theorem 6 is given in the full version of the paper.
I Theorem 6. The scheme is binding if Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 both hold.
4 Further Constructions
4.1 Polynomial Commitments from Constant-Size Assumptions
It is easy to see that any functional commitment for linear functions implies a polynomial
commitment. Indeed, in order to commit to a polynomial P [Z] = a0+a1Z+· · ·+an−1Zn−1 of
degree n− 1, we can simply commit to the vector of coefficients ~m = (a0, a1, . . . , an−1) ∈ ZnN .
When the sender wants to convince a verifier that P (x) = y, for some public x, y ∈ ZN , it is
sufficient to generate a witness Wy showing that 〈~m, ~x〉 = y, where ~x = (1, x, x2, . . . , xn−1).
Our construction of Section 3 thus implies the first polynomial commitment based on
constant-size assumptions. Indeed, the schemes of [19, 7] rely on q-type assumptions where q
is proportional to the maximal degree of committed polynomials.
4.2 Large-Universe Pairing-Based (Universal) Accumulators from
Constant-Size Assumptions
Catalano and Fiore [10] designed cryptographic accumulators from vector commitments.
While their construction yields an accumulator based on the Diffie-Hellman assumption, it only
supports small universes. Namely, accumulated values should come from a polynomial-size
domain since the public key has linear size in the cardinality of this domain.
It is easy to see that polynomial commitments imply accumulators for exponential-size
universes. While the size of the public key is linear in the maximal number of accumulated
values (as in Nguyen’s accumulator [26]), it does not depend of the universe size. As a result,
we can accumulate inputs consisting of arbitrary strings of polynomial length.
In order to accumulate a set S = {x1, . . . , xn−1}, one can commit to the vector
(a0, a1, . . . , an−2, 1) that contains the coefficients of the polynomial P [Z] =
∏n−1
j=1 (Z − xj)
and rely on the fact that x ∈ S if and only if P (x) = 0. A witness that xi ∈ S (resp. xi 6∈ S)
is obtained by generating a witness that the committed polynomial satisfies P (xi) = 0 (resp.
P (xi) 6= 0)). A concrete construction based on Assumptions 1 and 2 is described in the the
full version.
5 Accumulators Supporting Subset Queries
We now generalize the accumulator of Section 4.2 so that a constant-size witness W ∈ G can
provide evidence that a purported set X is contained in the hashed set S. Such a commitment
was previously designed by Papamanthou et al. [29] under a non-standard q-type assumption.
Our construction is thus the first realization based on fixed-size assumptions.
Gen(1λ, 1n): Choose bilinear groups (G,GT ) of composite order N = p1p2p3, where pi >
2l(λ) for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, for a suitable polynomial l : N → N. Choose g, u R← Gp1 ,
R3
R← Gp3 and α R← ZN at random. Let d ≤ n be the bound placed on size of a subset
(also polynomial in the security parameter). Define Gi = g(α
i) for each i ∈ [1, n] and
Uj = u(α
j) ·R3,j , where R3,j R← Gp3 for each j ∈ [1, (d+ 1)n] \ {n+ 1, 2n+ 1, . . . , dn+ 1}.
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The secret key is SK := {U`n+1}d`=1, where U`n+1 = u(α
`n+1)·R3,`n+1 with R3,`n+1 R← Gp3
for all ` ∈ [1, d]. The public key is
PK :=
(
g, {Gj}nj=1, {Uj}j∈[1,(d+1)n]\{n+1,2n+1,...,dn+1}, R3
)
.
Eval(PK,S): To hash a set S = {y1, . . . , yn′} of cardinality n′ ≤ n − 1, expand the
polynomial PS [Z] =
∏n′
j=1(Z − yj) =
∑n′
j=0mj · Zj . Choose γ R← ZN to compute and
output
V = gγ ·
n′+1∏
j=1
G
mj−1
j = gγ+α·PS(α), aux = (S, γ) (2)
WitCreate(PK, V, S, aux, X): Given a set S = {y1, . . . , yn′}, a subset X = {x1, . . . , xk} ⊆
S of size k ≤ d (we assume w.l.o.g. that x1, . . . , xk are arranged in some pre-determined
lexicographical order), and the state information aux = (S, γ) such that (V, aux) was
produced by Acc(PK,S), compute PS [Z] =
∏n′
j=1(Z − yj) =
∑n′
j=0mj ·Zj and define the
corresponding vector ~m = (m0,m1, . . . ,mn′ , 0, . . . , 0) ∈ ZnN . For each ` ∈ [1, k], define
~x` = (x`,1, . . . , x`,n) = (1, x`, x2` , . . . , xn` ) ∈ ZnN which satisfies PS(x`) = ~m · ~x` = 0. For
` ∈ [1, k], generate a witness that 〈~m, ~x`〉 = 0 by first using {U`n+1+j−i}j 6=i to compute
W`,i = Uγ`n−i+1 ·
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
U
mj
`n+1+j−i ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (3)
which satisfies e(V,
∏n
i=1 U
x`,i
`n+1−i) = e(g,W`,i) for all ` ∈ [1, k] since ~m · ~x` = 0. Then,
compute and output the witness WX =
∏k
`=1
∏n
i=1W
x`,i
`,i .
Verify(PK, V,WX , X): Given an accumulator value V ∈ G, a subset X = {x1, . . . , xk},
where xi ∈ ZN for each i ∈ [1, k], and a candidate a witness WX , do the following.
1. For each ` ∈ [1, k], define ~x` = (x`,1, . . . , x`,n) = (1, x`, . . . , xn` ) ∈ ZnN .
2. Return 1 if and only if e(V,
∏k
`=1
∏n
i=1 U
x`,i
`n+1−i) = e(g,WX).
From an efficiency standpoint, the size of PK is quadratic in n when d ≈ n so as to
handle queries for arbitrary subsets of size ≤ n. In comparison with [29], we thus achieve
security under simple assumptions at the expense of a somewhat larger public key. We see it
as an interesting open problem to retain O(n)-size public keys under simple assumptions.
We prove that the scheme provides collision-freeness (a detailed definition is given in
the full version) in that no PPT adversary can output a set S (of size ≤ n) along with a
verifying witness WX for another set X which is not contained in S. We thus use a natural
analogue of the definition of collision-freeness used in [15]: since our evaluation algorithm is
randomized, we assume that the adversary outputs the set S and the random coins γ of the
evaluation algorithm that lead to the accumulator value for which WX verifies.
The proof relies on the fact that the adversary outputs both the hashed set S and the
random coins γ of the hashing algorithm. It allows the reduction to use WX in order to
extract a membership witness for the difference X \ S using the homomorphic properties of
the underlying commitment. Having obtained WX\S , the reduction is also able to compute
an aggregation of non-membership witnesses for the same difference X \ S. From these
two conflicting witnesses, it is possible to extract some linear combination of the secret key
components {U`n+1}d`=1. In turn, this forces the adversary to predict a linear combination
of random function evaluations in the final step of the sequence of games. The proof is given
in the full version of the paper.
I Theorem 7. The scheme is collision-free if Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold.
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